EVIDENCE--MARITAL
VENTING ADVERSE
WITNESS

SPOUSE

PRIVILEGES-COMMON LAW PRIVILEGE PRESPOUSAL TESTIMONY VESTED
IN

FEDERAL

CRIMINAL

SOLELY IN

PROCEEDING-

Trammel v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 906 (1980).

Born of a desire to avoid the condemnation of one spouse by the
other, the common law privilege preventing adverse spousal testimony' remains as viable today as the institution which it was
created to protect. In an age of diminishing expectations regarding
traditional institutions, courts have become increasingly inclined to
challenge the much revered doctrines of the past as they relate to
those institutions. 2 What often remains is the essence of a once hallowed tradition, updated, by way of selective modification, for continued existence in contemporary society. Such is the case of the
privilege against adverse spousal testimony and its relation to the institution of marriage. In Trammel v. United States 3 the Supreme
Court of the United States constricted the scope of the marital
privileges by removing the privilege against adverse spousal testimony from the defendant spouse, thereby allowing it to remain, in
the witness spouse alone. 4 The decision marks a discernable departure from the traditional approach in which both spouses were held
competent to invoke the privilege, 5 although it does not otherwise
alter the nature of the privilege or its application.
The marriage ceremony of Elizabeth Ann and Otis Trammel, Jr.,
formalized the union of a young couple who later became engaged in
a conspiracy to transport heroin from Thailand into the United
States. 6 The importation scheme was devised at Clark Air Force
Base in the Philippines 7 by Otis Trammel and two of his neighbors,
co-defendants Joseph Freeman and Edwin Lee Roberts. 8 Ms.
Trammel participated in transporting the heroin and she served as an
operative along with Janice Keenan, a friend of Roberts. 9
18

J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2227 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as 8 J.

WIGMORE].

Trammel v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 906, 911 (1980).
100 S. Ct. 906 (1980).
Id. at 914.
Id. at 910. See notes 38-44 infra and accompanying text.
I United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1170 (10th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 100 S. Ct. 906
(1980).
7 Brief for Respondent at 2, Trammel v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 906 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Respondent].
8 Id. at 2-3.
1 United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 100 S. Ct.
906 (1980).
2
3
4
5
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In August 1975, Ms. Trammel smuggled an unspecified quantity
of heroin into California from Thailand, via the Philippines, for distribution by her husband in the Los Angeles area. 10 On a subsequent trip from the Philippines, with four ounces of heroin secreted
on her person, she was searched during a routine customs inspection
Ms. Trammel thereafter chose to
and promptly arrested in Hawaii."
cooperate with the authorities and served as a decoy, luring Roberts
2
to a previously arranged location where he was also arrested.'
Otis Trammel was indicted, along with co-defendants Roberts
and Freeman, on charges of "importation and conspiracy to import
14
heroin."13 Ms. Trammel, named as an unindicted co-conspirator,
was not prosecuted for her activities in furtherance of the conspiracy. 15 In order to secure her cooperation, the government assured
her of lenient treatment and she thereupon agreed to testify against
her husband pursuant to a grant of use immunity.16
In order to avoid the pernicious effect of his wife's testimony,
Trammel moved to sever his case from that of his co-defendants and
attempted to invoke the common law privilege of a defendant spouse
to prevent adverse testimony by a witness spouse.1 7 After a hearing
to determine the merits of Trammel's motion, the district court permitted Ms. Trammel to testify to "any act she observed during the
marriage and to any communication 'made in the presence of a third
person." "18 The court's ruling, although allowing the introduction of
adverse spousal testimony, preserved the separate and distinct testimonial privilege against the disclosure of confidential communications between spouses. 19 Trammel's objections to -this testimony
were rejected by the district court, 20 thereby sealing the government's case against him. 2 1 The court of appeals affirmed Trammel's
conviction for importation of heroin and conspiracy to import heroin,

10

Brief for Respondent, supra note 7, at 3.
11 100 S. Ct. at 908.

12 Brief for Respondent, supra note 7, at 4.
13 United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1167 (10th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 100 S. Ct. 906
(1980).
14 Id.
15 100 S. Ct. at 908 n.2.
16 Id. at 908.
17 Id.
18 100 S. Ct. at 908.
19 Id.
20 United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 100 S. Ct. 906 (1980).

The court of appeals held that since the defendant husband was a joint participant in a criminal
conspiracy with his wife he was precluded from invoking the privilege. Id. at 1169.
21 100 S. Ct. at 908.
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with one judge dissenting. 22 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in
Trammel v. United States. 23
Confusion as to the precise origin of the privilege against adverse
spousal testimony stems from the historically proximate appearance
of the disqualification or incompetency of one spouse to testify on
behalf of the other. 24 The policy considerations advanced for the
testimonial disqualification by marital relationship were similar to
those traditionally supporting all testimonial disqualifications based on
interest. An especially significant fear was that bias on the part of one
whose affection for the defendant would all but preclude impartial25
ity.
The raison d'btre of the privilege against adverse spousal testimony, first mentioned in 1580,26 was couched most often in terms
of a repugnance to allowing a man to be condemned by his wife 27 or
for the law to " '[compel] one [spouse] to come and betray the
other.' "28 This aversion to allowing adverse spousal testimony derived in part from the same latent distaste for spousal condemnation
as did the antiquated notion of petit treason, which consisted of violence against the head of a household. 29 Although the privilege
applies equally to husbands and wives, the model situation in all of
the earlier cases featured a wife bearing witness to the criminal acts
of her husband. 30 For analytical purposes this note will hereafter assume the traditional model.
In the midst of several common law pronouncements, many of
which obfuscated the distinction between the privilege and the disqualification, 3 1 appeared Lord Coke's admonition in 1628 that "it hath
beene resolved by the Justices that a wife cannot be produced either
against or for her husband." 32 The prevailing rationale was that such
22 Trammel was ultimately sentenced under the Federal Youth Corrections Act to an indeterminate term of years. 100 S. Ct. at 908.

23 100 S. Ct. 906 (1980).
24 8. J. WICMORE §§ 2227, 2228. Some early cases treated the privilege and the disqualifica-

tion as if they were supported by the same policy considerations, causing much confusion in
later years. Id. See notes 31-35 infra and accompanying text.
25 2 J. WIGMORE § 601 (Chadbourn rev. 1940). See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371
(1933).
26 Bent v. Allot, 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (Ch. 1580).
27 8 J. WIGMORE § 2227.
28 8 J. WIGMORE § 2228 (quoting Abbott, 2 The Trial of Henry Ward Beecher [Tilton v.
Beecher, City Ct. of Brooklyn, N.Y.] 49-50 (1875)).
29 8 J. WIGMORE § 2227.
30 Id.
31 Id.
12 E. COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 6b (1628). The quote continued, "quia funt

due anime in came una" ("for the, are two souls in one flesh"). Id.
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testimony was likely to cause disharmony between spouses. Thus,
Coke combined the privilege (not to testify against one's spouse) with
the disqualification (to testify on behalf of one's spouse) in the same
sentence, leading some to mistakenly conclude that the policy considerations underlying both were the same. Despite the misleading nature of his pronouncement, 33 Coke was nevertheless among the first
to articulate 34 what has survived as the most widely accepted policy
consideration advanced in support of the privilege: the preservation of
35
"the peace of families."
The much anticipated demise of the disqualification came in 1933
when the United States Supreme Court held in Funk v. United
States 36 that spouses were no longer prohibited from testifying on
behalf of one another. 3 7 The vitality of the privilege against adverse
spousal testimony was hardly as precarious, however, and when it
was examined fifteen years later in Hawkins v. United States 38 the
Supreme Court upheld the privilege as necessary for the continued
preservation of marital harmony. 3 9 The decision in Hawkins was
grounded in the belief that the law should not foster marital discord
by encouraging spouses to openly betray one another in court.4 0 In
addition, Hawkins reaffirmed the vesting of the privilege in both witness and defendant. 4 1 The impact of the decision was tempered,
however, by the Court's admonition that "this decision does not
foreclose whatever changes in the rule may eventually be dictated by
'reason and experience.' "42 Thus, pursuant to the law of testimonial
marital privileges which existed in the federal courts prior to the
43
Trammel decision, spouses could testify on. behalf of one another
and either could invoke the privilege against adverse spousal tes44
timony.
33 See generally 8 J. WIGMORE § 2228.

M Stapleton v. Crofts, 118 Eng. Rep. 137, 138 (Q.B. 1852).
35 Barker v. Dixie, 95 Eng. Rep. 171 (K.B. 1736). Similar language was adopted in Rex v.
Cliviger, 100 Eng. Rep. 143, 147 (K.B. 1788). As acknowledged in Trammel, the modern justification for the privilege "is its perceived role in fostering the harmony and sanctity of the narriage relationship." 100 S. Ct. at 909.
3r 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
37 Id. at 386-87.
38 358 U.S. 74 (1958).

39 Id. at 75.
4' Id. at 79. Another consideration expounded by the Court was 'the unwillingness to use
testimony of witnesses tempted by strong self-interest to testify falsely." Id.
41 Id. at 77-78.
42 Id. at 79.

43 See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
44 See notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text. An exception to Hawkins was recognized
where a crime is committed by one spouse against the other. Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S.

525 (1960). 100 S. Ct. at 910.
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A third aspect of the testimonial marital. privileges prevents the
disclosure of confidential communications between spouses. 4 5 The
earliest justification for this privilege, which preserves what the Supreme Court has called "the best solace of human existence," 4 6 was
derived from language in Stapleton v. Crofts.4 7 The confidential
communications privilege, although regarded as the most widely accepted of the marital privileges,4 8 has usually been inapplicable in
those situations in which the communication was made in the presence of a third party. 49 The continued vitality of the confidential
comnmunications privilege was therefore specifically acknowleged in
50
the Trammel decision.
The Supreme Court in Traminiel once again confronted the issue
whether a defendant spouse may invoke the privilege against adverse
spousal testimony to prevent the voluntary testimony of an adverse
witness spouse in a federal criminal proceeding. 5 ' Rule 501 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence provides that all testimonial privileges are
"governed by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience." 5 2 The intent of Congress in enacting Rule 501 was to
enable the courts to fashion an approach towards testimonial
privileges on a case-by-case basis.5 3 The Court was therefore free,
within the broad parameters of Rule 501, to redefine the scope of the
privilege by examining its validity in light of contemporary notions
regarding the sanctity of the marital relation. This analysis was accomplished through an examination of these notions vis-i-vis society's
54
interest in the expeditious administration of justice.

45 Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 220 (1839). The Supreme Court noted that "the
wife is not competent except in cases of violence upon her person, directly to criminate her
husband; or to disclose that which she has learned from him in their confidential intercourse."
Id.
46 1d. at 223.
47 118 Eng. Rep. 137, 139 (Q.B. 1852). The Court in Stapleton was of the belief that "the
confidence subsisting between husband and wife should be sacredly cherished." Id.
48 Comment, The Husband-Wife Privileges of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 N.W. L. REV.
208, 216 (1961).
49 Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934). The privilege is also inapplicable when
the communication bv its nature was not intended to be confidential. Id. at 14. See also Blau v.
United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333-34 (1951).
5o Trammel v.
United States, 100 S. Ct. at 909-10 n.5.
51 100 S. Ct. at 908.
52 FED. R. EVID. 501.
53 100 S. Ct. at 910-11. Congress rejected proposed Rule 505 which would have retained
the privilege to prevent adverse spousal testimony in the defendant spouse alone. Id. In addition, Rule 505 would have abolished the confidential communications privilege. Id.
54

Id.

at 912.
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The Court, while careful not to disturb the confidential communications privilege, 5 5 appreciably constricted the scope of the
privilege against adverse spousal testimony by vesting it solely in the
witness spouse. 56 At the time of the Trammel decision there were
four views among the states regarding the privilege. 57 The majority
view provided either for limitation of the privilege consistent with
Trammel or for its total abolition. 58 This trend in the states, together
with significant scholarly criticism of Hawkins, 59 must be acknowledged in analysing the Trammel Court's willingness to embrace the
very arguments which were found to be unpersuasive in Hawkins.
Implicit in the Court's recent departure from the rationale of
past decisions was the tacit admission that the law must maintain elasticity when confronted by doctrines of the past whose underpinnings
have been eroded by the passage of time and the sharpening focus of
judicial vision. 6 0 As Chief Justice Burger conceded in his opinion on
behalf of eight members of the Court, "[tjhe ancient foundations for
so sweeping a privilege have long since disappeared." 6 1 This was in
obvious reference to lingering notions of medieval paternalism which
have for centuries forestalled the recognition of women as separate
entities in the eyes of the law. 62 Specifically, Chief Justice Burger
was referring to the antiquated notion that a wife's testimony against
her husband was tantamount to self-incrimination since husband and
wife were viewed by the law as one person. 6 3 Similarly, the Court
dismissed as "unpersuasive the previously fashionable rationale that
vesting the privilege in the defendant spouse was necessary to foster
family peace. 64 The intellectual dishonesty of the historical reasoning
becomes apparent when applied to the instant case since its application

'5 See

notes 45-50 supra and accompanying text.

11 100 S. Ct. at 914.
57 Id. at 911-12 n.9. In eight states one spouse cannot testify against the other in a criminal
proceeding. Sixteen states allow both spouses or the defendant spouse alone to prevent adverse
testimony. The Trammel approach is taken by nine states which vest the privilege to refuse to
testify adversely in the witness spouse alone and the remaining seventeen states have abolished
the privilege in criminal proceedings. Id.
-5 Id. The current breakdown among the states is twenty-six in favor of a modified approach
and twenty-four against. Id.
11 Id. at 912 & 912 n.1l.
61 See id. at 911.
61

Id. at 913.

62

Id.

Id. at 909. The traditional view was that "husband and wife were one, and that since the
woman had no recognized separate legal existence, the husband was that one." Id.
63

64

Id. at 913.
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could easily have the perverse effect of allowing the defendant to
escape prosecution while subjecting his spouse to possible criminal
charges. 65
The Trammel Court was also sympathetic to the argument that
there is little marital harmony to preserve when the witness spouse
voluntarily agrees to give adverse testimony. 66 There are strong arguments, however, in support of the view that by vesting the
privilege in the witness spouse alone, he or she becomes the focus of
prosecutorial attention, vulnerable to enticing offers of immunity in
exchange for valuable testimony. 6 7 The foregoing interpretation renders "voluntariness" a vacant concept. Arguably, the detrimental effect of Hawkins (allowing the defendant to escape prosecution) is less
severe than the potentially detrimental effect of allowing the witness
to become subject to prosecutorial pressure. In seeking to allay the
fears of the skeptics, however, it must be emphasized that not all
prosecutors will be inclined to exert pressure on witnesses to secure
testimony.
The most penetrating indictment against the expansive nature of
a Hawkins-type privilege remains Jeremy Bentham's warning that it
secures, to every man, one safe and unquestionable and ever ready
accomplice for every inmagineable crime. '"68 As early as 1827,
Bentham was sensitive to the danger that a privilege of such breadth
could allow for the exclusion of all adverse testimony by a spouse.69
The Supreme Court also recognized that the privilege is distinguishable from not only the confidential communications privilege, but from
the traditional privileges of priest-penitent, attorney-client and
physician-patient. 70 Its uniqueness stems from the fact that it allows
evidence of communications made in the presence of third parties to
be excluded.71
The Trammel decision, in as much as it embodies the modern
trend, seeks to align itself with other recent developments in the law
which have endeavored to rectify past inequities regarding the legal

65

1d.

Id. "In these circumostances, a rule of evidence that permits an accused to prevent adverse spousal testimony seems far more likely to frustrate justice- than to foster family peace."
Id.
67 United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1171 (10th Cir. 1978) (McKay, J., dissenting),
affd, 100 S. Ct. 906 (1980). See also Comment, Marital Privileges and the Right to Testify, 34
U. CI. L. REV. 196, 204 (1966).
68 5 J.
BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 332, 338 (1827).
69 Id. at 338-40.
66

70 100 S. Ct. at 913.
71

Id.
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status of women. 72 Depending upon one's predelictions concerning
the prospective effect of the court's ruling, the extent of its progressiveness becomes subject to interpretation. Although vesting the
privilege in the witness spouse precludes the possibility that a defendant spouse might escape prosecution by claiming the privilege, it
places a correspondingly onerous burden upon the witness spouse.
Therefore, the witness (most often the wife) now assumes an appreciably greater control over her own destiny and that of her family. She
must weigh the myriad of possible consequences which could arise
should she decide to testify against her spouse. Knowing her husband
to be guilty, she would be torn between condemning him to a possible prison term or preserving what vestiges of their marriage remain. 73 The potential for prosecutorial abuse exists where a witness
like Ms. Trammel, who is less culpable than her defendant spouse,
could be coaxed into testifying for fear that she might be prosecuted
74
if she refuses to testify.
The all pervasive tension which envelops the area of testimonial
marital privileges is the balancing of marital harmony with the need
to administer justice. 75 The Hawkins approach represents a desire to
preserve the marital relation at the expense of allowing some to flout
the very rules which were enacted for their protection. 76 Although
the Trammel approach creates additional concerns for the witness, it
removes the possibility that a defendant might use the privilege designed to preserve the peace of his family to prevent his criminal
conviction. 77 A third approach, removing the privilege entirely except for confidential communications, 78 reflects the greatest emphasis
upon the need to apprehend criminals. Advocates of the privilege's
abolition could cite the transient nature of contemporary cohabitive
relationships as well as language characterizing the privilege as "an
archaic survival of a mystical religious dogma."79 This approach
tends to evidence a cynical view toward marriage, finding little worth
preserving in the traditional nuclear family when its vitality no longer
comports with the expeditious administration of justice.
The court of appeals in Trammel fashioned a novel approach toward the privilege by embracing arguments forwarded in several of
72
73
74
75
76

The
See
See
100
See

Court cited to Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
Comment, supra note 67, at 204.
note 67 supra and accompanying text.
S. Ct. at 912.
notes 38-41 supra and accompanying text & notes 64-65 and accompanying text.

77 100 S. Ct. at 913-14.
78 8 J. WIGMORE § 2337.

79 C. McCoRnMICK, EVIDENCE § 66, at 145-46 (2d ed. 1972) (footnote omitted).
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the circuits80 regarding the consequences of joint participation by a
husband and wife in a criminal conspiracy.81 The court adopted the
cogent reasoning advanced in United States v. Van Drunen82 that to
allow a defendant to invoke the privilege tacitly encourages the re83
cruitment of his or her spouse as an accomplice.
An accomplice spouse is especially valuable since he or she may
be conveniently silenced to accomplish the ends of crime.8 4 Although the consequences of joint participation are implicit in its holding, the Supreme Court made no mention of the trend in the circuits
in reaching its decision. The Court chose instead to bypass any consideration of the trend in favor of modifying the privilege in more
expansive langauge.8 5 Therefore, joint participation in a criminal
conspiracy need not be established to remove the privilege from the
defendant spouse.
A shift in societal values during the period since Hawkins provided the impetus for the Supreme Court to re-examine the privilege
at this time. The Trammel decision, although constricting the scope
of the privilege against adverse spousal testimony to insure against its
misapplication, nevertheless affirmed its viability as a dynamic concept. An additional motivation for the Court to clarify the law of testimonial marital privileges was that Trammel was factually suited to its purposes. It enabled the court to artfully remove a painful obstruction to the
continued vitality of the privilege against adverse spousal testimony while
avoiding a thorough examination of the law of marital privileges. A more
comprehensive analysis of the area must therefore await a factual setting
in which such broad review is required.
As Mr. Justice Black cautioned in an earlier dissent, "[wihen
precedent and precedent alone is all the argument that can be made
to support a court-fashioned rule, it is time for the rule's creator to

80 See United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d, 568 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Smith,

520 F,2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1975).
81 United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1169-70 (10th Cir. 1978), affd, 100 S. Ct. 906
(1980).
82 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974).
83 Id.
84

at 1396.

Id.

85 100 S. Ct. at 914.
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destroy it." 8 6 Since any prospective disintegration of the institution
of marriage would result in an increased scrutiny of the privilege by
those who would seek to hasten its demise, the privilege must by its
nature be continually tailored to comport with contemporary mores.

Thomas J. Pryor
86 Id.

at 911 (quoting Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 471 (1948) (Black, J.,

dissenting)).

